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Werner Heisenberg, Erwin Schro¨dinger and Wolfgang Pauli exhibited in their
works a strong and insistent interest in Greek philosophy. And this interest
–they claimed— was not at all separated from their investigations into the
new quantum theory. Heisenberg directly affirmed that “one could hardly make
progress in modern atomic physics without a knowledge of Greek natural phi-
losophy”. What does this claim mean? Why do these central figures in the
development of quantum mechanics saw the Greeks as their main inspiring
source? Why do they took them as a model for contemporary science, even
over their modern predecessors of Enlightenment? This work attempts to an-
swer these questions focusing on three main reasons: the revision of atomism,
the recasting of the meaning of “understanding” in physics, and the critique
of separations in science.
Keywords: Heisenberg, Pauli, Schro¨dinger, Greek philosophy, quantum me-
chanics
Never once did it occur to me to consider the science and technology of
our times as belonging to a world basically different from that of the
philosophy of Pythagoras and Euclid
Werner Heisenberg.
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I hope no one still maintains that theories are deduced by strict logical
conclusions from laboratory-books, a view which was still quite fashionable
in my student days
Wolfgang Pauli.
Introduction
The question, expressed in the title of this work, about the importance or
value of Greek philosophy for quantum physics, about the importance of
the oldest philosophy for the newest science, seems perhaps a bit extrava-
gant, maybe far-fetched. This impression is however rapidly dissipated when
one reads the works of three of the most important physicists of the early
XXth century, and three of the “founders” of the quantum theory. Werner
Heisenberg, Erwin Schro¨dinger and Wolfgang Pauli exhibited a strong and
insistent interest in Greek philosophy. And this interest –they claimed— was
not at all separated from their investigations into the new quantum theory.
The subject of this work can then be paraphrased, for further precision,
as the possible answers to the following questions: Why was the revision
of Greek philosophy so important for them? Why were Schro¨dinger, Pauli
and Heisenberg so interested in ancient Greek thought while working on the
new quantum physics? But even before answering why, we can certainly say
that they were not wrong in that interest. It will never be a mistake or a
waste of time to go back to the ancient Greeks. They will always be able
to teach us the art of thinking, the meaning of understanding, and they
will once again remind us what a peculiar and prodigious thing this human
endeavour of knowledge is. This rediscovery will most probably instill in us
a new freedom of thought, while at the same time rendering us loyal to the
rigors of that recovered original art of thinking and understanding. “Study
the Greeks”: that old advice is far from representing a conservative spirit,
this as much is proved by the fact that the most innovative among physi-
cists were the ones who saw the necessity to investigate what the Greeks
could show them.
These first thoughts, however allusive, already lead us to a first, intro-
ductory answer to the questions about the importance of revisiting Greek
philosophy for these physicists: the challenges quantum physics had set in
front of the physicists from the early XXth century couldn’t be tackled
with the known tools of classical physics, they needed to recuperate a more
flexible –yet always disciplined— way of thinking, and an approach to the
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question of understanding nature less burdened by the customs of their
immediate scientific context. In order to achieve that, a jump back beyond
the habits of modernity and into the lively Greek source, seemed to them
a proper means. As Schro¨dinger puts it: “By the serious attempt to put
ourselves back into the intellectual situation of the ancient thinkers (. . . )
we may regain from them their freedom of thought” [11, p. 19].
Only if we approach things in this manner we can understand what, at
first sight, seems like a persistent contradiction in the works of physicists
like Heisenberg, Pauli and Schro¨dinger: the relation between the conscience
of being faced with the necessity to take a jump forwards, to a new the-
ory radically different from the known physics, and the fact that, in this
task, they showed so much interest in what lay so far in the past, in the
most ancient scientists of them all, in the source of western science and
philosophy. Confronted with the strange indications of the quantum for-
malism, it may seem that the only thing we can do is to leap forwards into
the void, to do something completely and radically new, or to abandon all
hope of understanding and turn to instrumentalism. We tend to think that,
given the fact that what QM shows us does not fit at all with the image
of the physical world developed during the last five centuries, there is no
other support or precedent to rely on. This is for instance Bohr’s way of
thinking, for whom the concepts of classical physics would necessary remain
the concepts of physics for all times –and the reality expressed by quan-
tum physics would remain unknowable beyond metaphorical allusions. But
the fact is that there are other available associates that can, at least, help
shake off some habits of modern thought while remaining faithful to a sci-
entific spirit –and some of the founders of quantum physics understood this.
Aware of the apparent oddness of the attempt, Schro¨dinger tells us that,
when speaking about the subjects he later developed in his book Nature
and the Greeks, he felt the need to explain himself:
“There was need to explain (. . . ) that in passing the time with
narratives about ancient Greek thinkers and with comments on
their views I was not just following a recently acquired hobby of
mine; that it did not mean, from the professional point of view, a
waste of time, which ought to be relegated to the hours of leisure;
that it was justified by the hope of some gain in understanding
modern science and thus inter alia also modern physics.” [11, p. 3]
Heisenberg, less preoccupied by appearances, goes even further in claim-
ing that “one could hardly make progress in modern atomic physics without
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a knowledge of Greek natural philosophy” [8, p. 61]. One hopes, the other
is certain, but they both point to the same idea: this “progress”, this ad-
vancement, the radically new, is conditioned or, in any case, assisted, by
the old, by a knowledge of the original source. Without the ability to pose
again questions of principle, to recuperate a broader view of the task of
understanding nature, without the ability to shake off some modern pre-
suppositions, gained by the knowledge of the Greeks, it is difficult –they
believe— to be able to tackle the new atomic physics. For Pauli, the Greeks
also allowed them to acquire a more profound view of the problems they
were facing. Problems that seemed entirely new, but that could be in fact
related to the great old problems and dilemmas, and therefore placed in a
different perspective:
“The critical scientific spirit however reached its first culmination
in classical Hellas. It was there that those contrasts and paradoxes
were formulated which also concern us as problems, though in al-
tered form: appearance and reality, being and becoming, the one
and the many, sense experience and pure thought, the continuum
and the integer, the rational ratio and the irrational number, ne-
cessity and purposefulness, causality and chance” [9, p. 140]
As we revise those quotes, we are made aware of the striking contrast
between the common views of Schro¨dinger, Pauli and Heisenberg, and the
widely accepted vision today in scientific contexts –and certainly also among
philosophers of science—, according to which science, properly speaking,
originated in modern times, in the XVIIth century. These physicists from
the early XXth century did not see what began in the XVIIth century
and was developed over the following centuries as the origin of science, but
rather as the origin of the specific parameters of modern science that quan-
tum mechanics, among other developments, was rejecting. Enlightenment,
however admirable, was for them the establishment of a certain view of
science that had become problematic, and they saw better allies for their
task among the ancient Greeks. They found Plato, Pythagoras or Heraclitus
more useful than the modern philosophers and physicists. They were insis-
tent critics of the parameters of science established in the XVIIth, XVIIIth
and XIXth centuries. In their works they frequently make this contrast ex-
plicit, they distinguish between the aspects of science that had their origin
in the XVIIth century and that seemed now problematic (the separation of
the world in res extensa and res cogitans, the limiting of natural science to a
narrow materialism, the sharp separations among disciplines and faculties,
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etc.) and the ancient Greek model, which could help them overcome those
obstacles.
Quantum mechanics was born in a critical moment of modernity (that
stretches still to our times), it should not surprise us then that the most
lucid minds among those involved in the new physics saw the ancient more
fruitful and inspiring than the modern. Schro¨dinger pointed that this criti-
cal moment had created a sort of Zeitgeist leading him to the Greeks: “Far
from following an odd impulse of my own, I had been swept along unwit-
tingly, as happens so often, by a trend of thought rooted somehow in the
intellectual situation of our time.” [11, p. 14]. This Zeitgeist was expressed
in “the inordinately critical situation in which nearly all the fundamental
sciences find themselves ever more disconcertingly enveloped” [11, p. 5].
Among those fundamental sciences in crisis, physics of course stood out:
“The modern development [relativity and quantum mechanics],
which those who have brought it to the fore are yet far from re-
ally understanding, has intruded into the relatively simple scheme
of physics which towards the end of the nineteenth century looked
fairly stabilized. This intrusion has, in a way, overthrown what
had been built on the foundations laid in the seventeenth century,
mainly by Galileo, Huygens and Newton. The very foundations
were shaken” [11, p. 17]
Of course, this Zeitgeist pushing him to the Greeks arouse other re-
sponses as well. Ernst Mach’s response is, as Schro¨dinger reminds us, ex-
emplary: “he recommends a quaint method of getting beyond antiquity,
namely to neglect and ignore it” [11, p. 21]. But Pauli, Schro¨dinger and
Heisenberg, unconvinced by Mach’s tabula rasa, went on to express their
interest in Greek philosophy in relation to particular issues, that will be here
divided into three. One was the question of understanding : they turned to
the Greeks to recuperate a broader perspective on what it means to under-
stand nature through science, and they hoped this perspective would allow
them new room to maneuver. Another issue leading them to the Greeks
was separation: they turned to the ancients to try to find a way out of the
extremely compartmentalized and separated scientific landscape. And an-
other very different reason to read Greek philosophy was for them related
–as we shall see in the first section— not to its role in inspiring the new
physics, but to the critical analysis of the basis of modern science, which
in fact took much from some Greek philosophers. Schro¨dinger reminds us
that “the thinkers who started to mould modern science did not begin from
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scratch. Though they had little to borrow from the earlier centuries of our
era, they very truly revived and continued ancient science and philosophy”
[11, pp. 17-18]. And this “is a further incentive for us to return once again
to an assiduous study of Greek thought. There is not only (. . . ) the hope of
unearthing obliterated wisdom, but also of discovering inveterate error at
the source” [11, p. 18]. As we shall see right away, the main Greek influence
over modern physics, and the one that appeared as most problematic in the
XXth century, was atomism.
1. Versions of atomism
Explaining the different motives for the necessary study of the Greeks,
Schro¨dinger distinguished specially two reasons: on one hand, he hopes
they can inspire us to reunite what is now separated (philosophy and sci-
ence) and that shined as a unity among them; but the second reason aims
at producing, at the same time, a critical analysis of what turned out to
be problematic in the influence of Greek thought over modern physics. Un-
doubtedly, for Schro¨dinger, but also for Heisenberg and Pauli, the Greek
philosophy that most strongly and effectively informed the basis of modern
physical thought and that –given what QM was showing— appeared to
them as extremely problematic, was atomism. As usual, among them it is
Heisenberg who describes this philosophy best:
“The antithesis of Being and Not-being in the philosophy of Par-
menides is here secularized into the antithesis of the ‘Full’ and the
‘Void’. Being is not only One, it can be repeated an infinite number
of times. This is the atom, the indivisible smallest unit of matter.
The atom is eternal and indestructible, but it has a finite size. Mo-
tion is made possible through the empty space between the atoms.
Thus for the first time in history there was voiced the idea of the
existence of smallest ultimate particles –we would say of elementary
particles, as the fundamental building blocks of matter. According
to this new concept of the atom, matter did not consist only of
the ‘Full’, but also of the ‘Void’, of the empty space in which the
atoms move. The logical objection of Parmenides against the Void,
that not-being cannot exist, was simply ignored to comply with
experience” [6, pp. 65-66]
Quite rightly, Heisenberg describes atomism in contrast to Parmenidean
philosophy, and shows what, for many among the Greeks, seemed weak
about the atomist proposal. Let’s say a word about Parmenides to see if we
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can better understand Heisenberg’s quote. In his poem, Parmenides aims
at indicating the way which can lead us to true knowledge, if properly fol-
lowed. This path is supported by a main certitude, that Parmenides puts
in a famously brief manner: “is and not being is impossible” [DK 28 B].
Strangely, the conjugate verb is (est´ın in ancient Greek) appears without
subject. Who or what is? Parmenides seems to be purposely leaving the
verb without subject to differentiate his philosophy from those common al-
ready in Greek thought. If the previous or contemporary philosophers gave
privilege to one or several ‘elements’ or substances as origin and founda-
tion of nature (of which they primordially predicated being), or dedicated
their thought to decipher the hidden order that governs reality (the case of
Heraclitus), Parmenides starts by reflecting on a previous, humbler truth:
any ‘element’ we may choose, any ‘order’, anything of any nature, must be,
first, something that is, must share being. The simple yet universal, all-
encompassing fact of being (as Ne´stor Cordero puts it [1]) is the origin of
the Parmenidean wonder. Cordero’s proposition (that we take Parmenides’
being as the “fact of being”) is useful for it shows that Parmenides wishes
above all not to substantialize being. Parmenides’ being is not a transcen-
dent principle, is not The Being, The One, but the all-encompassing, irre-
ducible, fact of being –that he will later on in the poem refer to as “what
is”. But, as we saw, Parmenides thesis adds something else, it also affirms
the impossibility of not-being. In fact, it is this part of the thesis that is
most extensively and effectively developed throughout the poem. Accord-
ing to Parmenides, when we understand being in this manner, its opposite,
not-being, appears as impossible. And one of the most insisted upon ways
in which Parmenides phrases this impossibility in his poem is the one that
identies not-being with separation: “you will not sever what is from holding
to what is” [DK 28 B4]; “it is wholly continuous; for what is, is in contact
with what is” [DK 28 B8.25]; “Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike” [DK
28 B8.22]. In this sense, “not-being is impossible” means that there is no
cut, no strip, no ditch, inside being, through which not-being would pass.
Being has no cracks within, no interstices. There may be differences, but
there are certainly no ontological separations. It is this impossibility that
atomism, as Heisenberg puts it, simply ignores. They take being not in a
Parmenidean manner as the irreducible totality of existence, but as a kind
of indivisible and extremely small body, many times repeated, as a small
substance infinitely combined to construct reality, and so they postulate
that not-being (for this construction to happen) must also be.
Schro¨dinger, on his part, is satisfied with a more general description, one
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that does not pass through Parmenides, but that aims at rendering explicit
the fact that this ancient theory is still essentially our own: “the bodies
consist of discrete particles, which themselves do not change, but recede
from each other or come closer together, leaving more or less empty space
between them. That was their, and that is our, atomic theory.” [11, p. 64].
But what interests us now is that he later explains how this ancient and
quite strange theory came to be accepted in modern times and cemented
in our common sense:
“From the lives and writings of Gassendi and Descartes, who intro-
duced atomism into modern science, we know as an actual historical
fact that, in doing so, they were fully aware of taking up the theory
of the ancient philosophers whose scripts they had diligently stud-
ied. Furthermore, and more importantly, all the basic features of
the ancient theory have survived in the modern one up to this day,
greatly enhanced and widely elaborated but unchanged, if we apply
the standard of the natural philosopher, not the myopic perspective
of the specialist.” [11, pp. 82-83]
Those who established the basis of modern science found this ancient
theory useful, and so it became a fundamental part of the great intellectual
edifice they constructed, one that, in many essential aspects, lasts to our
days. Heisenberg also describes the historical path through which atomism
passed to us, specifically how it was united with the materialistic view that
began to take shape in modern times and that, dividing reality in res extensa
and res cogitans (a division to which we will go back later), limited physics
to the study of the mechanics of this now merely material res extensa:
“Matter was thought of in terms of its mass, which remained con-
stant through all changes, and which required forces to move it.
Because, from the eighteenth century onwards, chemical experi-
ments could be classified and explained by the atomic hypothesis
of ancient times, it appeared reasonable to take over the view of an-
cient philosophy that atoms were the real substance, the immutable
building-stones of matter. Just as in the philosophy of Democritus,
the differences in material qualities were considered to be merely
apparent; smell or colour, temperature or viscosity, were not actual
qualities of matter but resulted from the interaction of matter and
our senses, and had to be explained by the arrangements and move-
ments of atoms (. . . ). It is thus that there arose the over-simplified
world-view of nineteenth-century materialism: atoms move in space
August 9, 2020 18:4 WSPC - Proceedings Trim Size: 9in x 6in ”Fernandez Moujan - QM and the greeks DEFINITIVO”
9
and time as the real and immutable substances, and it is their ar-
rangement and motion that create the colourful phenomena of the
world of our senses” [8, p. 12]
Schro¨dinger too sees this modern atomist worldview as na¨ıve, he claims
that the term “atom” has become “a misnomer” [12, p. 183], and states
the fact that became evident for those involved in the development of the
new quantum theory: “modern atomic theory has been plunged into a cri-
sis. There is no doubt that the simple particle theory is too na¨ıve. This
is not altogether too astonishing, from the above speculations about its
origin” [11, p. 87]. The origin Schro¨dinger refers to is precisely described
in his book through a hypothesis that seems, in principle, well supported
by the ancient sources. He sees the atomic postulate as originating from a
widely known and discussed problem in Greek thought: the problem that
arose for the understanding of the physical world from the mathematics
of the continuum, mainly, the aspect of its infinite divisibility. This infinite
mathematical divisibility, when applied to the understanding of reality, gave
way to paradoxes (which were famously developed by Zeno of Elea, who
Plato saw in fact as supporting Parmenidean philosophy). And so, a limit
to this divisibility –for the physical world— was proposed by atomism as a
postulate, and these small indivisible bodies, separated by not-being, were
hypothesized. But this patch that once proved so effective seemed to be
peeling off in the early XXth century and its weaknesses started to show.
What was once a basic assumption for physical thought was now exposed
as an inadequate postulate, one that represented an obstacle for the new
theory. Schro¨dinger writes: “We have taken over from previous theory the
idea of a particle and all the technical language concerning it. This idea
is inadequate. It constantly drives our mind to ask information which has
obviously no significance” [12, p. 188]. But perhaps it is Heisenberg who
explains most clearly why the atomic postulate began to fail in quantum
theory:
“Let us discuss the question: what is an elementary particle? We
say, for instance, simply ‘a neutron’ but we can give no well-defined
picture and what we mean by the word. We can use several pictures
and describe it once as a particle, once as a wave or as a wave
packet. But we know that none of these descriptions is accurate.
Certainly the neutron has no colour, no smell, no taste. In this
respect it resembles the atom of Greek philosophy. But even the
other qualities are taken from the elementary particle. At least to
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some extent; the concepts of geometry and kinematics, like shape or
motion in space, cannot be applied to it consistently. If one wants
to give an accurate description of the elementary particle –and here
the emphasis is on the word ‘accurate’— the only thing which can
be written down as description is a probability function” [6, p. 70].
Quantum physics goes much further than atomism, which denied quali-
ties as smell, colour or taste for their elementary particles. Now even shape
or motion in space have to be excluded. What are we left with? The particle
loses, in quantum theory, all of its defining characteristics. As Schro¨dinger
writes, it even loses identity, “sameness”: an “elementary particle”, he says,
“is not an individual; it cannot be identified, it lacks ‘sameness’” [12, p. 183].
There’s almost nothing left of it, and what’s left, is certainly an aspect that
doesn’t seem too adequate to atomism, that could perhaps be better un-
derstood outside of the atomist frame: a strange probability that can’t be
interpreted in a classical manner, by ignorance, just as a mental calcu-
lation, as an abstract probability dependent on our degree of knowledge
about a real, actual particle. On the contrary, this is a probability that,
in fact, interacts. A new kind of probability, which seems to have physical
existence independently of an actual particle, of which Schro¨dinger rightly
points out: “Something that influences the physical behaviour of something
else must not in any respect be called less real than the something it influ-
ences” [12, p. 185]. In one instance, trying to provide a new understanding
of the reality of this quantum probability, Heisenberg finds a possible ally,
among the ancient Greeks, in Aristotle and in his concept of dynamis (po-
tency, possibility, capability: all possible translations) as a way of being;
a concept modern physics, in its beginnings, ignored to focus only on the
characterisation Aristotle did of the actual way of being —which of course
in Aristotle’s own philosophy could not be separated from the potential way
of being, as modern scientists did (see [4]). We should add that this last
example is quite representative of the conflict between the relation classical
physics established with ancient Greek thought and the relation that quan-
tum physics calls for. Exactly what was excluded, regarded as problematic
(Aristotle’s concept of potency) by classical physicists, became for those
who were developing the quantum theory an interesting possibility; and
what for classical physics functioned so well (the principles that for Aristo-
tle defined the formal and actual aspects of entities) became for quantum
theory na¨ıve and inadequate parameters.
But apart from his brief speculations about Aristotle’s concept of po-
tency, Heisenberg actually attempts to develop a peculiar and radically
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different atomist view; a strange, non-materialistic atomism, based on the
philosophy of one who, in fact, strongly opposed the atomists: Plato. We
can safely say that the Timaeus was one of the philosophical works that
most deeply influenced Heisenberg since a young age. Heisenberg himself,
in Physics and beyond, describes his entire intellectual itinerary as different
stations in his interpretation of Plato’s Timaeusa. Focusing on this dia-
logue, where through the character of Timaeus it is proposed as plausible
that pure geometrical forms are the building blocks of corporeal reality,
Heisenberg sees a Plato that develops Pythagoreanism in a new direction,
providing a different “atomism” –built up now from mathematical forms
and not from material indivisible bodies— that can be better related to
quantum mechanics. “Plato was not an atomist; on the contrary, Diogenes
Laertius reported that Plato disliked Democritus so much that he wished
all his books to be burned. But Plato combined ideas that were near to
atomism with the doctrines of the Pythagorean school and the teachings
of Empedocles” [6, p. 67]. Pauli shares with Heisenberg this Pythagorean
interpretation of Plato: “As a reaction against the (. . . ) atomists, Plato
took over into his doctrine of ideas many of the mystical elements of the
Pythagoreans. He shares with them his higher valuation of contemplation as
compared with ordinary sense experience, and his passionate participation
in mathematics, especially in geometry, with its ideal objects.” [9, p. 141].
Both Pauli and Heisenberg see Plato as taking much from the Pythagore-
ans, but steering away from what appeared as mystical associations, which
Plato wished rather to gain –without losing what was profound in them—
for knowledge, constructing in this way a synthesis that Pauli regards –as
we shall later see— as a model.
According to Heisenberg’s Platonic atomism, “the smallest parts of mat-
ter are not the fundamental Beings, as in the philosophy of Democritus, but
are mathematical forms. Here it is quite evident that the form is more im-
portant than the substance of which it is the form” [6, p. 69]. Heisenberg,
through his peculiar Platonic atomism, is purposely disobeying the modern
division between res extensa and res cogitans which confined physics to
the material res extensa. And this is not done by incorporating the subject
(his choice, his perspective, etc.); he is incorporating real intelligible, for-
mal, elements in the explanation of the physical world as the elements that
constitute the inherent order which untiredly unfolds in nature: “atoms are
aAnd he does this in a book of dialogues. Both the form and content of this book show
the original and profound Platonism of Heisenberg.
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not things. This was probably what Plato had tried to say in his Timaeus,
and, seen in this light, his speculations about regular bodies were begin-
ning to make more sense to me” [7, p. 11]. “Our elementary particles are
comparable to the regular bodies of Plato’s Timaeus. They are the original
models, the ideas of matter. [As] Nucleic acid is the idea of the living being.
These primitive models determine all subsequent developments. They are
representative of the central order.” [7, p. 241]. These mathematical forms,
the ideas of matter, argues Heisenberg, should not however be interpreted
as geometrical forms. This is the limit of the association with Plato:
“modern physics takes a definite stand against the materialism of
Democritus and for Plato and the Pythagoreans. The elementary
particles are certainly not eternal and indestructible units of mat-
ter, they can actually be transformed into each other. (. . . ) But
the resemblance of the modern views to those of Plato and the
Pythagoreans can be carried somewhat further. The elementary
particles in Plato’s Timaeus are finally not substance but math-
ematical forms. (. . . ) in modern quantum theory there can be no
doubt that the elementary particles will finally also be mathemat-
ical forms, but of a much more complicated nature. (. . . ) The con-
stant element in physics since Newton is not a configuration or a
geometrical form, but a dynamic law. The equation of motion holds
at all times, it is in this sense eternal, whereas the geometrical
forms, like the orbits, are changing. Therefore, the mathematical
forms that represent the elementary particles will be solutions of
some eternal law of motion for matter” [6, pp. 71-72].
To further clarify the nature of these mathematical forms, it is useful
to introduce another ancient Greek philosopher that Heisenberg sees as
capable of inspiring an understanding of quantum mechanics: Heraclitus.
Heisenberg repeats the traditional –yet highly questionable— interpretation
of Heraclitus as a philosopher that, as some of his contemporaries, chose
an “element” as origin and fundament of reality. In his case, this element
is fire: “He regarded that which moves, the fire, as the basic element.”
[6, p. 62]. Heisenberg finds that what Heraclitus says about fire as the
basic, transformable element, can now be applied to energy: “the views of
modern physics are in this respect very close to those of Heraclitus if one
interprets his element fire as meaning energy. Energy is in fact that which
moves; it may be called the primary cause of all change, and energy can be
transformed into matter or heat or light.” [6, pp. 71].
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With the aim of reuniting these two Greek influences, Heisenberg theo-
rizes the “elementary particles” –now thought of as mathematical forms—
as formal stationary conditions of this same Heraclitean “stuff”, as the el-
ements of that central order (the dynamical law) that inform this basic
energy/matter seen in analogy with Heraclitus fire:
“This state of affairs is best described by saying that all particles
are basically nothing but different stationary states of one and the
same stuff. Thus even the three basic building-stones [protons, neu-
trons and electrons] have become reduced to a single one. There is
only one kind of matter but it can exist in different discrete sta-
tionary conditions. Some of these conditions, i.e., protons, neutrons
and electrons, are stable while many others are unstable” [8, p. 46].
As interesting as this Platonic atomism may seem, one can’t help but to
wonder why the insistence on developing an atomist view. Why does this
obligation persist when there is in fact nothing left to support it? Why not
leave atomism aside altogether? It is Schro¨dinger who finds an explanation
for this fixation on atomism:
“atomism has proved infinitely fruitful. Yet the more one thinks of
it, the less can one help wondering to what extent it is a true theory.
Is it really founded exclusively on the actual objective structure of
’the real world around us’? Is it not in an important way condi-
tioned by the nature of human understanding—what Kant would
have called ’a priori’?” [11, p. 88].
This worldview that seemed to describe the fundamental nature of phys-
ical reality started to appear –at least for Schro¨dinger— rather as a presup-
position that constantly and inadvertently conditioned our way of perceiv-
ing the world –and one that was most inadequate. To follow the association
with Kant’s terminology, we can say that atomism appeared now also as
dogmatism, as a metaphysical presupposition assumed without criticism.
Criticism seemed then to be in order, a critical analysis of the worldview
that determined the parameters of physical understanding. So why do we
still today hear with such certitude that quantum mechanics talks about
elementary particles? Because, for the most part, this critical task was pre-
vented by the influence of Bohr and of positivist philosophy on physics and
philosophy of science. The critical analysis of classical concepts and the de-
velopment of different systems of concepts for this new physical theory was
limited by Bohr, who claimed that the only language for physics could be
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the language of classical physics. At the same time, positivist philosophy
evacuated metaphysics from its fundamental role in scientific theories, and
turned it into just a mere storytelling one can –mostly inconsequentially—
add, if one desires to do so, to an already functional, empirically adequate
theory. So, in this way, atomism, instead of being the object of that crit-
icism that Schro¨dinger alluded to, was crystalized, in a dogmatic manner,
as a basic presupposition not to be questioned again and, at the same time,
all other conceptual endeavours –which could be critical of that presuppo-
sition— were cast away or reduced to mere storytelling. One inadequate
worldview was thus installed as a basic common-sense presupposition, and
the –truly fundamental— intellectual endeavour which could favour criti-
cism of that worldview and which could give rise to other possibilities, was
reduced to inconsequential narratives. So physicists today claim to the gen-
eral public that quantum mechanics talks about small elementary particles.
Faced with interested questioning they will admit that these are not really
small determined particles, but strange “quantum” particles, of which little
can they say, and, ultimately, they will claim that, in any case, this talk
of elementary particles is really just a “way of talking” we unimportantly
adhere to an already empirically adequate theory. But actually, as Einstein
insisted, “It is the theory which decides what we can observe” [7, p. 63].
Atomism is for physics not only –as we carelessly claim— just “a way of
talking”, but more profoundly, a way of thinking, imagining and even per-
ceiving, of which we are many times unaware. This presupposed worldview
is, as Schro¨dinger points out, the source of many of our missteps. It still
makes us see what we are in fact not seeing (a particle when a “click”
happens in a detector), it makes us ask the wrong questions, and forces
us to give widely inadequate answers to those already problematic ques-
tions. The critical analysis that Schro¨dinger demands on the influence of
certain aspects of Greek philosophy that appeared at the beginning of the
XXth century as problematic –aspects that, through their reinterpretation
in modernity, became a truly fundamental part of physical thought— re-
mains still, for a great part, to be done. This is certainly one of the reasons
why the task of investigating Greek philosophy for the sake of our own
contemporary scientific theories has not grown old yet.
2. Revisiting understanding
Schro¨dinger writes: “the present crisis in modern basic science points to the
necessity of revising its foundations” [11, p. 18]. It was not just a matter of
filling some remaining gaps. They knew they were not faced only with new
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discoveries that could help complete the mosaic of modern physics. They
were faced, on the contrary, with the evidence of a complete disconnection
between what was being developed in quantum physics and the previous
theoretical parameters as they were expressed not only in explicit scientific
theories, but also –as we have seen with the example of atomism— in the
presupposed worldview that gave sense to the perceived physical phenom-
ena. For there to be understanding of the quantum phenomena, for them to
be able to do physical science faced with these new developments, they were
obligated to revise, rethink, the fundamental parameters of modern science.
They had to ask again what doing physics meant and entailed, they had to
take a look at the conditions –if they existed— of the human understanding
of nature. The available modern answers were no longer enough. In all of
these physicists we see this awareness: they take as a central matter they
analyze, discuss, tackle, the question of what “understanding” means in
physics. And in order to do that, they often turn to the Greeks. Of course,
by that time there exists at their disposal a quite practical response to this
question, an easy way out: the positivist renounce, the rejection of the pos-
sibility of understanding nature, and the redefinition of science as a merely
coherent record of observations.
“One would in this context have to discuss the questions: what
does comprehensibility really mean, and in what sense, if any, does
science give explanations? David Hume’s (1711-76) great discov-
ery that the relation between cause and effect is not directly ob-
servable and enunciates nothing but the regular succession —this
fundamental epistemological discovery has led the great physicists,
Gustav Kirchhof (1824-87) and Ernst Mach (1838-1916), and others
to maintain that natural science does not vouchsafe any explana-
tions, that it aims only at, and is unable to attain to anything but, a
complete and (Mach) economical description of the observed facts.
This view, in the more elaborate form of philosophical positivism,
has been enthusiastically embraced by modern physicists” [11, pp.
90-91].
Before raising the obvious questions that this positivist stance provokes
in us (are we to take these “observed facts” as innocent givens? What jus-
tifies “economy” as a parameter of this “description”? etc.), let us merely
point out a fact that goes often unnoticed: this is an attitude towards knowl-
edge that has as its sources not only modern empiricism, but also ancient
Greek thought. We are referring, of course, to sophistry. The Manifesto of
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the logical positivists makes this influence explicit: “Everything is accessi-
ble to man; and man is the measure of all things. Here is an affinity with
the Sophists, not with the Platonists; with the Epicureans, not with the
Pythagoreans; with all those who stand for earthly being and the here and
now” [3].
Contrary to what its fame indicates, it is not only the taste for contro-
versy what lies behind sophistry, there are some originally sophistic posi-
tions —which evidently arose from an opposition to philosophy as it was
developed among the first philosophers— that justify their praxis. Some
strongly skeptical postures. These are positions that undermined the ba-
sis of the attempt to understand nature. For most of them, and specially
for two of the greatest among them –Protagoras and Gorgias—, all we
have is what we perceive. As radically as the modern empiricists, they
discarded knowledge beyond individual perceptions. This aspect of their
thought pushed them to relativism. The only remaining text pertaining to
Protagoras, which, as we read, the logical positivist quoted in their Mani-
festo, makes this relativism explicit: “Man is the measure of all things, of
the things that are, that they are, of the things that are not, that they
are not” [DK 80 B1]. We don’t possess more of Protagoras’ text but we
do have some comments about his philosophy that date back to antiquity,
and they all seem to coincide in confirming a relativistic view. According
to this stance, there is no such thing as ‘a reality of things’ —or at least,
if there is one, we are not able to grasp it. We can only refer to our own
perception. Although he fails to relate this with empiricism and positivism,
Schro¨dinger takes the time to revisit Protagoras: “Protagoras regarded the
sense perceptions as the only things that really existed, the only material
from which our world-picture is made up. In principle all of them have to
pass for equally true” [11, p. 30]. At the same time, since scientific and
philosophical discourse could not be knowledge, could not relate to truth,
the discursive aspect of these intellectual activities detached, in sophistry,
from its function in knowledge and became a matter to be treated inde-
pendently, and so formal characteristics, as mere coherency and economy,
could be justified as ends in their own right.
What perhaps seems odd in this relation between sophistry, modern em-
piricism and positivism is that, while positivists claimed to enable by their
position a scientific progress, the Greek sophists, as well as the British
empiricists, concluded more reasonably in skepticism. But maybe the key
to understand what this scientific “progress” means can still be found in
these older sources, especially in sophistry and in the practical orienta-
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tion they gave to scientific and intellectual activity (since true knowledge
was discarded). They redirected the goal of discursive argumentations from
knowledge to praxis, to the creation of effects. Since, among these effects,
truth –if it existed— could not be differentiated from a mere rhetorical
effect, it was this effect production, the ability to convince, act, produce
changes by these discourses, the true purpose of what could no longer be
regarded as knowledge of reality. And if one follows positivism until the end,
both in arguments and in history, one arrives also to a practical justification
for science: instrumentalism.
In any case, what is certain is that Schro¨dinger, Pauli, Heisenberg, as
well as Einstein, coincide in rejecting the positivist “solution” to the fun-
damental question of understanding. Einstein, for example, sees the “eco-
nomic” principle defended by Mach as way too na¨ıve. But the main issue
with positivism is, for all of them, its simplistic concept of observation.
Heisenberg, Pauli and Einstein will respond to Mach what Kant added to
Hume: observation is in itself theoretically laden. Observations cannot be
taken as innocent givens. Causality –Kant argued—is surely not directly
observable, but it always determines observation, and a priori determina-
tions such as causality are what makes experience and objectivity possible.
These a priori conditions are, quite fundamentally, part of all observations
for all subjects. Mach wished to vanish a priori concepts and stick to obser-
vation but, by his blind tabula rasa attitude, he actually helped make the
concepts that, in fact, determine observation, remain unconscious, unanal-
ysed for many that, still today –willingly or not— continue to follow this
na¨ıve empiricism. In a conversation they held in 1925, Einstein explained to
Heisenberg –as we commented earlier— that in fact: “It is only the theory
which decides what we can observe”. Pauli also insists on this matter: “Per-
sonally I do not see how it is possible to give a definition of the phenomenon
in physics which seeks to isolate the data of perception from rational and
ordering principles. It seems to me rather that a separation of this sort is
itself already the result of a special critical mental effort which removes
the ever-present unconscious and instinctive ingredients of thinking” [9, p.
128].
But there is yet another thing that, according to Schro¨dinger, positivism
leaves unexplained:
“For even if it be true (as they maintain) that in principle we
only observe and register facts and put them into a convenient
mnemotechnical arrangement, there are factual relations between
our findings in the various, widely distant domains of knowledge,
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and again between them and the most fundamental general notions
(as the natural integers 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . ) , relations so striking and
interesting, that for our eventual grasping and registering them the
term ‘understanding’ seems very appropriate” [11, p. 92].
This is of course the expression of one of the original and simplest amaze-
ments which always arouse the curiosity inherent in knowledge. These “fac-
tual relations” we apprehend between what appears in completely different
domains, and between those discoveries and our general notions –a relation
that, in fact, allows for the possibility of, among other things, a logical,
coherent, even “economical” order to be applied to phenomena, as posi-
tivists want—, all of this must be explained. It seems, at least, that there is
something like an order developed as well in our own activity as in different
domains of reality. What is the nature of this order? Is it an illusion or
does it point to an inherent order in nature? This is of course one of Kant’s
main questions. And his answer is well known: that “order” is originated in
subjective –although universal, that is, transcendental— conditions. Tran-
scendental conditions equally determine experience and understanding for
every empirical subject. The order of nature (as experience) is for Kant in
fact the order of the transcendental subject. Those “factual relations” have
their origin in the a priori structure of the transcendental subject. But, un-
fortunately, Kant’s proposal was not a possible solution for the founders of
QM. In fact, Kant appeared to be rather part of the problem, and new allies
were needed to rethink this fundamental question. The new discoveries of
physics violated Kant’s a priori conditions, there were in fact experiences
which could not be subsumed by the pure concepts of understanding (the
categories) and the pure forms of intuition (universal space and time) Kant
believed to be universal:
“The theory of relativity has changed our views on space and time,
it has in fact revealed entirely new features of space and time,
of which nothing is seen in Kant’s a priori forms of pure intuition.
The law of causality is no longer applied in quantum theory and the
law of conservation of matter is no longer true for the elementary
particles” [6, p. 88].
What was previously seen as the conditions for all possible experience
and as the parameters of objectivity and understanding now appeared as
the limited conditions of a particular worldview that no longer could be
taken as universal. Kant’s transcendental subject contained the conditions
of modern science –it was in fact in part inspired by that science (specially
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by Newtonian mechanics)—, but that was no longer enough: “We agree
with P. Bernays in no longer regarding the special ideas, which Kant calls
synthetic judgements a priori, generally as the pre-conditions of human un-
derstanding, but merely as the special pre-conditions of the exact science
(and mathematics) of his age” [9, p. 126]. Mach had also pushed for the
rejection of Kant’s a priori conditions, but without proposing a different
solution, a different explanation for what those conditions allowed to un-
derstand. He rejected the Kantian a priori determinations as he rejected all
possible a priori concepts, aiming to limit the scientific scope only to what
is directly observable. But the question of the theoretical determination
of observation and the question of those “factual relations” that arouse a
sense of understanding nature remained then unanswered. Positivism de-
nied the solution by also denying the problem. This was an attitude that
Schro¨dinger, Heisenberg, Pauli and Einstein thought they could not allow
themselves. Faced with the crisis of the modern parameters of knowledge
and experience, some of these physicists turned instead, beyond the modern
source, to the original source, they jumped back to ancient Greece, in order
to rethink scientific understanding.
Heisenberg reconstructs the words of a young Pauli in a conversation
they held in 1921, precisely about what “understanding” meant in physics
when stripped down to its most essential meaning:
“knowledge cannot be gained by understanding an isolated phe-
nomenon or a single group of phenomena, even if one discovers
some order in them. It comes from the recognition that a wealth of
experiential facts are interconnected and can therefore be reduced
to a common principle. (. . . ) ‘Understanding’ probably means noth-
ing more than having whatever ideas and concepts are needed to
recognize that a great many different phenomena are part of a
coherent whole. Our mind becomes less puzzled once we have rec-
ognized that a special, apparently confused situation is merely a
special case of something wider (. . . ). The reduction of a colourful
variety of phenomena to a general and simple principle, or, as the
Greeks would have put it, the reduction of the many to the one,
is precisely what we mean by ‘understanding’. The ability to pre-
dict is often the consequence of understanding, of having the right
concepts, but is not identical with understanding” [7, p. 33].
Understanding is for Pauli –according to Heisenberg— not just piec-
ing together multiple observations through coherent or economical logical
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propositions, it only comes with the recognition –conceptually elaborated—
of their common principle, of the reality of the whole their interconnections
point to. Understanding is being able to pass from a vision of isolated phe-
nomena to a general reality in which those phenomena show their relation
and their meaning (their place). Or, to take Schro¨dinger’s words, it is to
pass from the amazed yet uninterpreted vision of “factual relations” in
reality to the common principle they express (and that explains their ex-
istence). As can be seen exemplified in almost every Platonic dialogue, an
isolated individual “understanding” is not truly understanding and cannot
help us gain knowledge. It is only through a wider interconnection that is
able to point to a common principle, capable of explaining the subsumed
experiences, that “understanding” happens, and, with it, knowledge. What
those constellations indicate, what those general principles express, that is
in fact the goal of knowledge for the Greeks philosophers (and not just what
is “directly” observed).
It is also important to add that, according to Heisenberg’s Pauli, this
can only happen through concepts. There is no understanding without con-
cepts: there is no possible representation of the principles the phenomena
point to without concepts, and there is no understanding of the individual
phenomena without that representation. Phenomena can be understood
only through their principles, and these can only be represented with con-
cepts. As remarked by Heisenberg [8, p. 264]: “For an understanding of
the phenomena the first condition is the introduction of adequate concepts.
Only with the help of correct concepts can we really know what has been
observed.” Of course, we need the ability to pose the right questions, to
go against our own suppositions, to identify the decisive relations and ar-
rive at an adequate system of concepts in order for that “reduction” Pauli
speaks of to really occur (in Platonic terms: we need to learn the difficult
art of dialectics). We cannot force its occurrence under inadequate concepts
–as it widely happens today with QM. We cannot produce that unity by
mere will, at out pleasure. We cannot force our presuppositions if they are
not adequate. The Greeks propose we exercise an equilibrium: the fear of
factual errors shouldn’t make us renounce general principles for the sake of
“exact” although unexplained observations, and, at the same time, the de-
sire for grasping the general should not make us postulate no matter what
inadequate principles too fast, or assume a detached mystical attitude. Al-
though difficult, this “reduction” can be produced. And this ability is what
Heisenberg refers to as the great heritage of Greek thought:
“What always distinguished Greek thought from that of all other
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peoples was its ability to change the questions it asked into ques-
tions of principle and thus to arrive at new points of view, bringing
order into the colourful kaleidoscope of experience and making it
accessible to human thought. (. . . ) Whoever delves into the phi-
losophy of the Greeks will encounter at every step this ability to
pose questions of principle, and thus by reading the Greeks he can
become practised in the use of the strongest mental tool produced
by western thought” [8, pp. 52-53].
This fruitful strategy we take for granted, this disciplined yet broad, me-
thodical yet artful ability to arrive at the unities manifested in multiples,
and to proceed with those principles in a way that enables us to under-
stand the world by ourselves, this is what the Greeks developed and what
originated our intellectual attitude and strategy. According to Heisenberg,
we are reminded of this each time we aim for the root of things in whatever
scientific discipline:
“Those (. . . ) who (. . . ) wish to get to the root of things in their
chosen vocation (. . . ) are bound sooner or later to encounter the
sources of antiquity, and their own work can only profit if they have
learnt from the Greeks how to discipline their thoughts and how to
pose questions of principle” [8, p. 63].
The first expression of this ability directed Greek thinkers to the ques-
tion of physis. This term is generally translated as “nature” and its mean-
ing covers what we refer to when we talk about “the nature of reality”
(its essence), as well as what we commonly, broadly and in an extensive
way refer to as nature: the reality in which we take part. Nature is, for
the first Greek philosophers, something dynamic, changing, which —at the
same time— responds to some sort of internal order, substance or formula.
This internal order is what they seek to understand. While for Kant real-
ity’s readability, its order, criteria, came from subjective conditions, for the
Greeks those conditions were themselves real beyond the subject (although
encompassing also the subject), they were the criteria, the formula, the or-
der inherent to reality, which always rules reality. Those “factual relations”
Schro¨dinger referred to were rather interpreted as signals pointing to an in-
herent order in reality that philosophy and science aimed to capture. Some
of these first philosophers proposed an “element” (or a series of them) from
which —and according to which— all reality develops and can be explained.
Aristotle calls them the physikoi, the physicists or naturalists. Schro¨dinger
also points to the fact that our scientific attitude finds its origin there: these
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physikoi, he says, “saw the world as a rather complicated mechanism, act-
ing according to eternal innate laws, which they were curious to find out.
This is, of course, the fundamental attitude of science up to this day” [11,
p. 57].
Heraclitus redirected the search for the fundament of physis no longer
to an “element” but to the description of a formula, an internal order that
rules physis. He allusively described this formula and called it lo´gos. This
denomination is very significant for the development of philosophy. Until
Heraclitus’ use of the word, lo´gos had a meaning almost exclusively re-
lated to language: discourse, argumentation, account, even tale. In all of
those translations we can see already something that will be essential to all
meanings and nuances of lo´gos, even when it doesn’t refer to language: a
significant combination, a reunion with criterion, a collection with purpose.
Lo´gos never means an isolated word, or a meaningless sentence, or dispersed
and ineffective ensembles of words. It always refers to a combination that
has a reason, that is able to produce an effect or to exhibit a meaningb.
We now begin to understand why Heraclitus chooses this specific word to
name the internal order of physis. He sees in nature exactly that: a combi-
nation that is not meaningless dispersion, on the contrary, it responds to
a formula, a criterion. This double meaning of lo´gos (order of physis and
human discourse) also expresses for Heraclitus –and this is fundamental—
an affinity between human discourse and reality, an affinity that allows for
knowledge. Thus, there is a relation between the lo´gos of human beings and
the lo´gos of physis. It is not a simple task to expose the true lo´gos since,
as remarked by Heraclitus, “physis loves to hide” [DK 22 B 123], but it is
none the less possible: in a particular lo´gos one can “listen” something that
exceeds it, that is not only that personal discourse but the lo´gos of physis,
or, as Heisenberg likes to call it, the central order: “Listening not to me but
to the lo´gos it is wise to agree that all things are one” [DK 22 B 50].
Plato develops this further, he renders this lo´gos of physis more precise;
it is no longer described only in a general manner, as the Heraclitean op-
posites in the tension of a peculiar harmony, and the path to its knowledge
is not so obscurely alluded, but now methodologically developed. What
Heraclitus calls the lo´gos of physis is for Plato the realm of Ideas. Ideas
are the elements (the forms) that populate, constitute, the lo´gos of ph-
ysis, the central order. These Ideas are different, each one is to be found
bWe follow Ne´stor Cordero, who thoroughly described in a recent book the transfigura-
tions of the notion of lo´gos in Greek philosophy (see [2])
August 9, 2020 18:4 WSPC - Proceedings Trim Size: 9in x 6in ”Fernandez Moujan - QM and the greeks DEFINITIVO”
23
and known through particular dialectical efforts; these Ideas have different
relations among them and with phenomena. They allow for more than a
general, allusive, assessment of unity and order in nature, they allow for the
different unities, principles, expressed in phenomena to be, each of them,
apprehended through methodical efforts, and related among them. In any
case, it is this Platonic development, generally known as his “theory of
Ideas”, that Pauli reinterprets and, with Jungian accents, elaborates on.
Specifically, what Pauli seems to emphasize in his reading of Plato is the
question of reminiscence. For Plato, learning and understanding suppose
necessarily a previous presence of Ideas in ourselves. Understanding comes
then when, through methodical efforts, we “remember”, we recognize in the
investigation of the world something that is also essential to our thought.
The dialectical endeavour of understanding reality is in Plato, undoubtedly,
an effort that asks of us to reject what is only merely personal in our think-
ing, our opinions and judgments, but in doing so, we encounter that what
is truly universal was in fact already in ourselves. An encounter with the
universal in ourselves that only occurs through the methodical investigation
of reality. As well as in the rest of physis, Ideas are expresses in us.
“With Plato’s philosophy in mind, I should therefore like to suggest
that the process of understanding nature, as well as the happiness
that man feels in understanding, that is, in the conscious realisation
of new knowledge, should be interpreted as a correspondence, a
coming into congruence of inner images pre-existent in the human
psyche with external objects and their behaviour. The bridge (. . . ),
which cannot be constructed by pure logic, rests, according to this
conception, on a cosmic order independent of our choice –an order
distinct from the world of phenomena, embracing psyche as well as
physis” [9, p. 125].
That “recognition” Heisenberg remembered in his friend’s words is here
specified. Understanding nature is the “coming into congruence” of pre-
existent images in human psyche and external objects and their behaviour:
this seems rather Kantian. But these convergent forms are not originated
in the subject, projected by him, are not the property of human conscience,
they are not restricted a priori to the limited parameters of modern sub-
jectivity, they come from a greater cosmic order which is expressed as well
in human psyche as in physis. Understanding is the result of a process by
which the forms we read in phenomena –under certain methodically de-
termined conditions— show their affinity, correspondence, with something
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we recognize in ourselves, and this is made possible by a cosmic order –an
order which is, by this process, made available to our thought. The bridge
that enables that recognition in understanding is not made of pure logic,
cannot be developed from phenomena by pure logic. Logic alone cannot cre-
ate that congruence, that moment of understanding (and happiness). Logic
cannot create the pre-existent ideas, the forms that enable understanding
(it can only suppose and eventually express them). A fundamental cosmic
order contains the conditions of that affinity that is actualized in the con-
gruence. For that understanding to occur –for us to recognize in ourselves
the forms we perceive— there must exist for Pauli a common medium and
origin that enables that real affinity. Understanding is thus the conscient
correspondence between the human lo´gos and the lo´gos of physis, as it is re-
discovered –or “remembered”, to put it in Platonic terms— in its expression
in phenomena. As Walter Benjamin was also attempting at the same time,
Pauli is, in a way, Platonizing Kant, by broadening the conditions of un-
derstanding to allow for more than just the modern mechanical experience
Kant’s a priori determinations justified, and by relocating these conditions
outside of the subject: “According to the conception here put forward, the
a priori character of Kant’s rationally formulated ideas, laid down once for
all, is thus transferred to the pre-existent images (archetypes) present and
operating outside of consciousness” [9, p. 126].
This “coming into congruence” is the astonishing fact the Greeks were
always looking to show and explain, Pythagoreans with the magical corre-
spondence between mathematics and reality, Plato with the experience of
reminiscence, Heraclitus with the multiple meanings of lo´gos, etc. And it is
by this understanding that theories come into being:
“Theories come into being through an understanding inspired by
empirical material, an understanding which we may best regard,
following Plato, as a coming into congruence of internal images
with external objects and their behaviour. The possibility of un-
derstanding again demonstrates the presence of typical regulatory
arrangements, to which man’s inner as well as outer world is sub-
ject” [9, p. 129].
By this realisation of knowledge, by this process of understanding na-
ture, the typical regulatory arrangements, the ordering principles in physis,
are demonstrated and represented. It is this central order that theories aim
to represent. And it is by this order, as it is manifested in theories, that
phenomena become meaningful, that they can be seen as belonging to a
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greater whole. They stop being isolated, or, as Plato said, they are saved.
3. Critics of separation
Another important motive for the return to the Greeks is easily found in
the works of Heisenberg, Pauli and Schro¨dinger. They are quite insistent
on this one. And perhaps it can be said that this reason subtends the other
reasons, that it is expressed or supposed by them, although in different
degrees. It is the problem with separation. It is –specially for Schro¨dinger,
Heisenberg and Pauli, but also for Einstein— one of the main obstacles
for the further development of physics in particular and science in general.
A separation that they identified already in the XVIIth century, and that
grew with time until it became untenable in the XXth century. Which sep-
aration? We actually find in their writings a multiplicity of them –although
clearly related—: separation between scientific and speculative knowledge,
between scientific and metaphysical attitudes, between experience and the-
ory, between natural sciences and philosophy. Separation expressed also in
the objects of knowledge: between res extensa and res cogitans; as well as
more and more (and sharper and sharper) separations between disciplines.
It was for instance the growing separation between scientific and philosoph-
ical endeavours that had caused, according to Schro¨dinger, a “grotesque”
and childish spectacle he witnessed in the scientific world: “This produces
the grotesque phenomenon of scientifically trained, highly competent minds
with an unbelievably childlike —undeveloped or atrophied— philosophical
outlook” [11, p. 12].
However problematic these separations can be in principle, they be-
came in fact untenable due to the new scientific developments of the XXth
century, especially in quantum physics. These authors couldn’t help but
notice that separations which may had been instrumental and effective for
the physics of previous centuries appeared now as burdens. Starting from
those separations, maintaining those separations, quantum mechanics was
unintelligible. We already encountered some of the problems requiring they
undo separations: how to recast the parameters of scientific understand-
ing without revising natural philosophy? How to understand observation
beyond modern presuppositions without rediscovering the irreducible and
fundamental relation between theory and experiment, between metaphysics
and experience? How to transform radically our atomist way at looking at
things without critically analysing atomist natural philosophy? How to un-
derstand a probability that interacts from the point of view of a narrow
materialism that only recognizes res extensa as physical reality? Einstein,
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Schro¨dinger, Heisenberg and Pauli saw very clearly that the critical anal-
ysis of those separations and the effort to overcome them were necessary
tasks for the science of their time. The last three of them found, as they
worked on the subject, an irreplaceable model for the reunion that they
were seeking in the Greeksc:
“We look back along the wall: could we not pull it down, has it al-
ways been there? As we scan its windings over hills and vales back
in history we behold a land far, far, away at a space of over two
thousand years back, where the wall flattens and disappears and
the path was not yet split, but was only one. Some of us deem it
worthwhile to walk back and see what can be learnt from the allur-
ing primeval unity. Dropping the metaphor, it is my opinion that
the philosophy of the ancient Greeks attracts us at this moment,
because never before or since, anywhere in the world, has any-
thing like their highly advanced and articulated system of knowl-
edge and speculation been established without the fateful division
which has hampered us for centuries and has become unendurable
in our days” [11, pp. 13-14].
The Greeks were the model for an “advanced and articulated” effort of
understanding that did not depend on separations, an uncompartmental-
ized way of thinking that they needed in order to face the challenges ahead.
They were in fact confronted with problems that could not be tackled from
the worldview and with the tools that modern physics presented them.
They were in need of a broader perspective on the parameters of science
and on the nature of physical reality. In their jump back to the Greeks they
believed they could recuperate an understanding of the original scientific
endeavour (which was one with natural philosophy), riding themselves of
the habits and separations that had become common sense in their dis-
ciplines, and that were now blocking the way to the development of the
new theory. Although developing different aspects of this process of sepa-
ration in human knowledge, Schro¨dinger, Heisenberg and Pauli coincide in
presenting the Greeks as the model for a non-separated, rigorous yet bold,
scientific attitude.
cEinstein was more interested in a modern philosopher, one that was especially focused
in tackling the problem of separation in our worldview: “I am fascinated by Spinoza’s
Pantheism. I admire even more his contributions to modern thought. Spinoza is the
greatest of modern philosophers because he is the first philosopher who deals with the
soul and the body as one, not as two separate things” (cited from [13])
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Heisenberg concentrated especially on the critical analysis of the sep-
aration that determined for physics –and natural sciences in general— an
over-simplified object of knowledge: the res extensa, a world defined and
limited through a narrow materialism. Nothing beyond the mechanics of
independent matter. A determinism of material bodies. A narrow materi-
alism that, according to Heisenberg, enters inevitably into a crisis with the
appearance of quantum mechanics. Indeed, how to account, for instance,
for quantum probability, or for a principle of indeterminacy, in the context
of this extreme form of materialism? He finds the basis of this separation
were most clearly and definitely determined by Cartesian philosophy, which
he presents in contrast with Greek thought:
“While ancient Greek philosophy had tried to find order in the in-
finite variety of things and events by looking for some fundamental
unifying principle, Descartes tries to establish the order through
some fundamental division” [6, p. 78].
Let us start by the distinction that is made in Heisenberg’s words be-
tween finding order and establishing order. It marks a fundamental differ-
ence between the Greek and the Cartesian way of looking at things; the
difference between apprehending an order seen as existent, and establish-
ing, forging, an order, to better determine and organize our knowledge. The
second contrast presented by Heisenberg is between unifying and separat-
ing. While for the Greeks finding order meant understanding what unifies,
for Descartes the aim was establishing order by being able to separate.
“This bases of the philosophy of Descartes is radically different from
that of the ancient Greek philosophers. Here the starting point is
not a fundamental principle or substance, but the attempt of a
fundamental knowledge” [6, p. 78].
For Heisenberg, Descartes’ basic aim was not, as it was the case for
the Greeks, to decipher the meaningful complexity of nature from its in-
herent principles or elements, but rather ‘what and how can I know with
certainty?’. It is the adaptation to the parameters that define certainty for
the subject what is fundamental here, rather than developing a way of ap-
prehending the inherent parameters of nature. The question is different and
thus the answer is different, and Descartes’ answer is undoubtedly quite a
prodigious one; an answer that certainly transformed philosophy: as much
as I doubt, I cannot deny that I think –since this doubting is thinking—,
and since I am certain that I think, I certainly am (dubito, cogito, sum).
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But Descartes finds himself locked in a solipsist certainty, he is only cer-
tain of the isolated I. How to advance beyond the cogito? How to recover
reality? This is done through a version of the old ontological argument that
functions as a proof of the existence of God: God must also exist, since
I have an idea of God that I could have not produced by myself (since I
don’t have the amount of formal reality to produce the amount of objective
reality that this idea entails); and given that God exists, the world in front
of me, of the I, cannot be entirely a deceiving illusion. But, for Heisenberg,
this reconstruction is problematic, since these added relations cannot dis-
guise the fact that he sets a fundamental division as the bases for further
reasoning:
“his starting point with the ‘triangle’ God-World-I simplifies in a
dangerous way the basis for further reasoning. The division between
matter and mind or between soul and body, (. . . ) is now complete.
God is separated both from the I and from the world. God in fact
is raised so high above the world and men that He finally appears
in the philosophy of Descartes only as a common point of reference
that establishes the relation between the I and the world” [6, p.
78].
Descartes is, in principle, only certain of himself, of the isolated I. Then
through God he establishes the existence of the world –as what the I has in
front of him. God sets up a narrow bridge between what is fundamentally
an isolated I and a separated, strange, world. And at the same time, by
the same movement, the world is impoverished: although God functions as
guarantee of the existence of the world, his work or expression is not recog-
nizable in it. The world is at the same time guaranteed and emptied. It is
the mere world, an exterior landscape that affects my senses, that appears
opposed to the I. God is evacuated from the world and the I, and repre-
sents only the guarantee of their relation. But this relation between the I
and the world is the –weak— relation of two strangers, of two separated
elements, and this reality now opposed to the subject and emptied of inher-
ent meaning is defined as res extensa. Descartes establishes as the basis for
further thinking, as the bases for knowledge, for the different scientific and
philosophical endeavours, a fundamental separation. Starting from the sep-
aration of God, the I and the world, starting from the separation between
a res extensa and a res cogitans, it seems we can better determine and or-
ganize knowledge. This is opposite in intention and in origin to the Greek
way, which took as its most important object of knowledge the inseparable
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interrelation, interdependency, between physis and its lo´gos, between the
multiplicity of the world and the Ideas that define its essence, between re-
ality and its unifying principles. Surely, as Heisenberg points out, it is not
completely fair to exclusively accuse Descartes for this sharp separation in
human knowledge, but none the less –Heisenberg adds— it is certainly he
who established more definitely the basis for such a separation, and for the
narrow content of natural science:
“Of course Descartes knew the undisputable necessity of the con-
nection, but philosophy and natural science in the following period
developed on the basis of the polarity between the ‘res cogitans’
and the ‘res extensa’, and natural science concentrated its inter-
est on the ‘res extensa’. The influence of the Cartesian division on
human thought in the following centuries can hardly be overesti-
mated, but it is just this division which we have to criticize later
from the development of physics in our time” [6, pp. 78-79].
Where the Greeks saw the necessity of the interconnection between “sen-
sible” and “intelligible”, between becoming and nous, as they knew that
neither of these could be understood without the other, modernity (at least
an important part of it) was convinced by the necessity of division. And the
merely “material”, alienated from what was before related to its inherent
meaning, was, with time, isolated as the business of independent natural
science. It is a world emptied of its essential content, its inherent meaning,
its principles. An emptied world which will understandably lead to the vi-
sion of its contingency, and, in empiricist philosophy, to skepticism (which
will only be avoided by projecting objectivity and order into the world by
means of the subject). The physical world was for the first time established
as an object of knowledge completely separated as well from the subject as
from God, from the Ideas, the lo´gos, etc. (although this separation will be
rejected by later philosophers, as Spinoza for instance, for whom God and
nature were synonyms). It is perhaps interesting to get back now, for a brief
moment, to Heisenberg’s atomism: takings as a starting point his critique
of separation, we can perhaps better understand his attempt to reintroduce
forms –in his case mathematical forms— as essential elements of physical re-
ality –violating in this way the Cartesian separation, introducing something
beyond res extensa as the object of physics, and attempting to understand
nature from a worldview closer to the one the Greeks had. But, indepen-
dently of his exploration of a Platonic atomism, what Heisenberg fails to
point out –and, as we shall see, this will have a definitive influence on his
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conception of quantum physics— is that, while redefining the world as res
extensa, Descartes is also redefining and narrowing res cogitans, thought,
which is now –contrary to the Greek or Spinoza’s worldview— identified ex-
clusively with subjective conscience. In any case, what is certain is that this
separation, with its modern redefinition of the object of physics, is some-
thing that, to Heisenberg, quantum mechanics calls into question. This is
why, on this matter, Greek thought and not Enlightenment should be for
him the inspiring source.
Although he shares some of Heisenberg’s historical hypothesis, Pauli is
the critic of another separation, between what he calls two types of knowl-
edge or two attitudes towards knowledge, one related to mysticism, to the
experience of “oneness”, the denial of the world’s multiplicity as illusion,
and aimed –he argues— at salvation, and the other a scientific attitude,
rational and methodical in its means, but “dispassionate” and incapable to
see through multiplicity to the fundamental reality of unity. These represent
for Pauli two poles, two attitudes presented as opposed for analytical pour-
poses, but with different relations in different times; sometimes reunited,
even mixed, sometimes separated, related only by their mutual exclusion.
It is the radical and sharp separation between the two poles that Pauli sees
as problematic, the times when we witness an uncritical and superficial
mysticism on one hand, and, completely separated, a narrow, short-sighted
scientific view on the other. He believes to be living in one of those times.
He starts a conference from the mid 1950’s reminding his listeners that
many of the fundamental discoveries and bases of our science come from
the synthesis of those attitudes, as is the case of the ancient discovery of
the “enigmatical” possibility of applying mathematics to nature: “The pos-
sibility of mathematical proof, and the possibility of applying mathematics
to nature, are fundamental experiences of humanity, which first arose in
antiquity. These experiences were at once regarded as enigmatical, super-
human and divine, and contact was made with the religious atmosphere” [9,
p. 139]. Pauli believes that “it is the destiny of the occident to keep bring-
ing into connection with each other these two fundamental attitudes” [9, p.
139], to combine the oriental mystical inclination with a western scientific
attitude, seeking surely to understand, but without sacrificing “oneness”,
rather gaining it for understanding, following, as he says, “the Greek spirit”.
But before entering the Greeks, let us remember first Pauli’s characteriza-
tion of the “mystical” attitude: “Mysticism seeks the unity of all external
things and the unity of the inner man with them; this it does by seeking
to see through the multiplicity of things as illusory and unreal” [9, p. 139].
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Mysticism seeks an experience of unity that reveals multiplicity as illusory
and unreal (as well as demonic). And its search is, according to Pauli, a
search for salvation:
“Thorough-going mysticism does not ask ‘why?’ It asks ‘how can
man escape the evil, the suffering, of this terrible, menacing uni-
verse? How can it be recognised as appearance, how can the ulti-
mate reality, the Brahman, the One (. . . ) be seen?’ It is however in
keeping with the spirit of Western science –in a certain sense one
might say with the Greek spirit— to ask, for instance, ‘why is the
One mirrored in the Many? What is it that mirrors, and what is
mirrored? Why has the One not remained alone?’” [9, p. 139].
The different questions show the transformation the Greeks, this is, phi-
losophy and science in its origins, bring to the more mystical attitude. Their
new scientific –or, as Pauli will say, “lucid”— mysticism, that inaugurates
western philosophy and science. It is the transformation of a mysteric wis-
dom into an understanding in which, however, that “oneness” is not lost.
The same that is for the mystic the object of a vision, is now, mostly striped
from its esoteric aura, conceived and justified as a fundamental object of
knowledge; and by this transformation the attitude towards multiplicity
also changes: it is not denied, but, on the contrary, explained. The one is
not lost, it is rather –more soberly— turned into a matter of understand-
ing. Greek philosophy also seeks, as mysticism according to Pauli, “the
unity of all external things and the unity of the inner man with them”,
but it does so in a different manner, where that unity can be an object
of understanding and the goal of a somewhat methodical endeavour. They
believe the experience of oneness can be rather its understanding. And, in
this understanding, the unity is not gained by rejecting reality, by erasing
multiplicity. On the contrary, there’s no rigorous apprehension of the one
without the specific many it encompasses, and conversely, it is only in the
one that the many is interpreted and understood. It is a rephrasing that
changes everything. The questions are no longer “how can I escape this
deceiving multiplicity? how can I reject this apparent world to experience
the true oneness beyond?” but rather turn into something like “what is the
relation (which is not of mutual exclusion) between the one and the many?
why is this multiple given? How does this one encompasses and determine
this many?”. As Heisenberg said, the Greeks rephrased the questions as
questions about principles.
If the mystical attitude must be, according to Pauli, synthesized with
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the scientific, this also means that the former cannot be completely aban-
doned. The scientific attitude without the intention to understand what
is object of the mystical attitude is insufficient, it cannot even justify and
explain the nature of the multiplicity it concentrates on. It is a knowledge
that eventually becomes short-sighted, dispersed and narrow, as it had oc-
curred –Pauli believes— to the science of his time: “we can say that at
the present time a point has again been reached at which the rationalist
outlook has passed its zenith, and is found to be too narrow” [9, p. 147].
Pauli thinks that quantum mechanics, among other recent developments,
demands a broadening of this separated scientific attitude, the recasting
of what modernity had locked in too narrow limits, approaching and over-
coming what lay separated: a too schematic scientific attitude and a too
detached and exaggerated mysticism. To develop in further detail this syn-
thesis that he sees as the task of the occident, Pauli names two attempts
that were made in this direction, but concentrates rather on one of them:
“Among the attempts that have occurred in the course of history to
effect a synthesis of the basic attitudes of science and of mysticism
there are two which I would like particularly to stress. One of these
originates with Pythagoras in the sixth century B.C., is then carried
on by his disciples and developed further by Plato, appearing in late
antiquity as Neo-Platonism and Neo-Pythagoreanism. Since much
of this philosophy was taken over into early Christian theology, it
continues thereafter in persevering association with Christianity,
to blossom anew in the Renaissance. It was through (. . . ) a return
to Plato’s doctrine of knowledge in Galileo’s work, and through a
partial revival of Pythagorean elements in that of Kepler, that the
science of modernity, which we now call classical science, arises in
the seventeenth century. After Newton it rapidly separates itself
on rational-critical lines from its original mystical elements” [9, p.
140].
As Heisenberg, Pauli also saw Plato in an essential continuity with the
Pythagoreans: “Plato (428-348 B. C.) took over into his doctrine of ideas
many of the mystical elements of the Pythagoreans. He shares with them
his higher valuation of contemplation as compared with ordinary sense ex-
perience, and his passionate participation in mathematics, especially in ge-
ometry, with its ideal objects” [9, p. 141]. But Pythagoras represented still,
according to Pauli, a clear mystical attitude: “He and his disciples founded
an expressly mystical doctrine of salvation, which was most intimately tied
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up with mathematical thought, and was based on the earlier Babylonian
number-mysticism.” [9, p. 141]. It is Plato who takes a fundamental step
forward:
“As a further development of Pythagorean teachings Plato’s mysti-
cism is a lucid mysticism, in which understanding, in its various de-
grees, from opinion (do´xa) through geometric knowledge (dia´noia)
to the highest knowledge of general and necessary truths (episteme)
has found its place” [9, p. 142].
In this continuity, it is in Plato that the transformation towards under-
standing settles, and, above all, that it does so with unequalled precision
and awareness. Plato does more than suggesting that what was the object of
a mystical approach can be the object of an understanding: he establishes
the conditions of that understanding (as well as the mistakes or detours
that commonly prevent understanding) and tries to develop the ways that
can lead to it. And in that process of understanding he is able also to dis-
tinguish and specify its different degrees and modes, depending on their
different objects, their distinct languages and capacities to encompass phe-
nomena. What is only do´xa? What is dia´noia? What is truly episteme –the
knowledge of principles? What relations do they have, what dependencies
among them? He even aims at distinguishing among the higher objects of
knowledge, developing his theory about Ideas. In Plato we find the highest
image of our faculties. In Plato, the mystical and the knowable, the dif-
ferent disciplines, the one and the many, are not separated. And this does
not mean that they lie together in an undifferentiated and allusive unity.
On the contrary, he is able to distinguish among what is reunited. And,
most importantly, he teaches us how to develop the capacity to do it for
ourselves.
After Plato, Pauli sees an emphasis on the mystical attitude gaining
momentum in the work of the Neoplatonists:
“the mystical side of Plato’s work gradually gave rise to Neo-
Platonism, which achieves more or less systematic formulation in
Plotinus (204 to 270 A. D.). Here we find the identity of the Good
with the comprehensible carried to an extreme, as compared with
Plato’s own view, and coarsened by the doctrine that matter (hyle)
is a simple lack (privatio) of ideas, that it is moreover the embod-
iment of Evil and that this is therefore a simple privatio boni, a
lack of Good, which cannot be the object of conceptual thought”
[9, p. 141].
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Pauli then jumps over the Middle ages, right to the Renaissance:
“The Renaissance was an epoch of extraordinary passion, of furor,
which in 15th and 16th century Italy broke through the barriers
between different human activities, and brought into the most in-
timate connection things formerly separated, such as empirical ob-
servation and mathematics, manual techniques and thought, art
and science” [9, p. 143].
This was not –Pauli argues— an epoch of “dispassionate science” [9,
p. 143]. Science was not separated from debates about Greek philosophy,
from Neoplatonism, not even from mysticism. It is only in the later XVIIth
century, as expressed in Descartes’ philosophy and Newton’s mechanics,
that he sees the scientific attitude beginning to take a separate path: “The
later more dispassionate seventeenth-century way of looking at things led
to Descartes’ analytical geometry and to the absolute space of Newton’s
mechanics” [9, p. 144]. This leads, like Heisenberg also pointed out, to a
separation of the world-picture, but also to the introduction of separations
among different disciplines and faculties: “Among the general characteristic
manifestation of the seventeenth century is the re-establishment of new
boundaries between single disciplines and faculties, and the splitting of the
world-picture” [9, pp. 144-145]. That path, Pauli believes, had found its
limits and called for a renewed synthesis that would allow us to recast our
relationship to knowledge. But how to answer that call? How to approach
the poles? How to recuperate that original, broader, way of understanding
nature?
“I believe that there is no other course for anyone for whom narrow
rationalism has lost its force of conviction, and for whom also the
magic of a mystical attitude, experiencing the external world in its
crowding multiplicity as illusory, is not effective enough, than to
expose himself in one way or another to these accentuated contrast
and their conflicts. It is precisely by this means that the scien-
tist can more or less consciously tread a path of inner salvation.
Slowly then develop inner images, fantasies or ideas, compensatory
to the external situation, which indicate the possibility of a mutual
approach of poles in the pairs of opposites” [9, p. 147].
Faced with a “narrow rationalism” on one side, and with the irrational,
ineffective “magic of a mystical attitude”, Pauli advices us not to escape
this situation or to solve it dogmatically, but rather to honestly experience
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its conflicts and the limitations of both stances. He pushes us to experience
and grasp how one lacks what the other has; how both seem unsatisfying
in the end; how they turn superficial when isolated from each other; how
both make good points and encompass things we recognize as meaningful
but, in the end, remain so evidently narrow. It is important to understand
why and how they fail, what they lack, what they have forgotten and, by
these experiences, to develop the ideas which can effectively, precisely, lead
to the needed synthesis. It is a truly Platonic advice, a dialectical advice.
It is the kind of path that Platonic dialogues take, and it is for instance the
one an old Parmenides advices a young Socrates to take in one of Plato’s
later dialoguesd.
Final remarks: Bohr’s persuasion
It is puzzling: the developments we just investigated in Heisenberg’s and
Pauli’s works coexist with some other affirmations that enter with the for-
mer, quite evidently, in clear and fundamental contradictions. This can only
be explained by Niels Bohr’s influence. We know, for instance, how those
separations we talked about were “resolved” in some places of Heisenberg’s
and Pauli’s works, and it was certainly not in line with the Greek spirit they
took as a model. Instead of following his investigation into Greek philoso-
phy as it pointed the way to a more complex and meaningful representation
of the world, a world expressing its principles, its inherent meaning, Heisen-
berg chose frequently –following Bohr— to take the Cartesian concepts, to
accept the reduction of the world realized in them, and simply collapse one
over the other. Instead of following through with his critical analysis of the
basic division and organization of the world in modern thought, instead of
taking as a model what he pointed as exemplary in the Greeks, Heisenberg
accepted the modern limitation of res cogitans to subjectivity and followed
Bohr’s “synthesis”, according to which the subject directly creates physical
reality. Faced with what he saw as na¨ıve materialism, instead of following
his own diagnostics, he accepted for the most part Bohr’s proposal of an
empowered relativism that subordinates physical reality to the subject. And
contrary to the Platonic spirit, with its higher valuation of our intellectual
capacities, Pauli curiously ended up, on some occasions, following Bohr’s
“solution” of a premature limitation of knowledge. Niels Bohr’s power of
persuasion will never cease to amaze. He disguised a renounce (the quan-
tum realm is unknowable) as a new heroic breakthrough (the subject creates
dthe Parmenides
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physical reality); he simply rephrased the paradoxes that appeared when
using classical concepts to represent quantum phenomena by calling them
“complementary” –instead of critically analyzing those concepts— and yet
somehow convinced many. He drew an arbitrary limit to our knowledge and
the limit was incredibly respected. Rather than recasting the conditions of
knowledge inspired by the broader Greek view, Pauli and Heisenberg ac-
cepted at times, following Bohr, the limitation of the concepts of physics to
the concepts of classical physics: “the unambiguous interpretation of any
measurement must be essentially framed in terms of classical physical theo-
ries, and we may say that in this sense the language of Newton and Maxwell
will remain the language of physicists for all time.” [14, p. 7].
It is certainly a perplexing aspect of their works. Heisenberg’s Platonic
atomism, with the introduction of forms as the real elements of the cen-
tral order which is constantly determining reality, is very far from Bohr’s
proposal. Pauli’s view about understanding, which take as its fundamental
thesis a cosmic order that is expressed as well in physis as it is in psyche,
seems also incompatible with Bohr’s ideas. And yet, they both tended at
times to embrace Bohr’s turn. Schro¨dinger himself, even if he can’t be ac-
cused of being close to Bohr, makes some of the same assumptions. This
can be seen directly in some of his interpretations of Greek philosophers,
as he projects in their philosophies a modern worldview. This is clear, for
instance, in how he reads Parmenides, of whom he says: “The true reality
he puts into thought, into the subject of cognizance as we should say. (. . . )
The [real world] (. . . ) resides in the subject, in the fact that it is a subject,
capable of thinking, capable of some mental process at least” [11, p. 29].
And it is most especially clear in his final remarks about the “peculiar fea-
tures” of our scientific view of the world, which he develops on similar lines.
We have been thinking quantum mechanics mostly along Bohrian lines for
quite some time now, and we still face the same unresolved paradoxes, we
still regret our incapacity to complete the theory, we are still unable to
represent the reality expressed in quantum physics. Maybe it is not a bad
idea to revisit some of the less transited paths taken by those who first
developed this theory, when, in search of a wider and flexible yet rigorous
understanding of nature, they turned at times for inspiration, even beyond
the Enlightenment, to the Greek source.
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